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Abstract 
Political scientists frequently use qualitative evidence to support or evaluate the empirical 
applicability of formal models. Despite this widespread practice, neither the qualitative 
methods literature nor research on empirically evaluating formal models systematically 
address the topic. This article makes three contributions to bridge this gap. First, it 
demonstrates that formal models and qualitative evidence are indeed frequently combined 
in current research. Second, it shows how process tracing can be as important a tool for 
empirically assessing models as statistical testing, because models and process tracing 
share a common focus on understanding causal mechanisms. Lastly, it provides new 
guidelines for using process tracing that focus on issues specific to the modeling enterprise, 
illustrated with examples from recent research. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the introduction of formal models into political science, their relationship with the 
rest of the discipline has provoked vigorous discussion. Early debates about whether 
formalization or rational choice approaches contribute to our understanding of politics have 
largely given way to more applied discussions about the appropriate relationship between 
formal theories and empirical research.1 Yet these discussions have centered on how (or 
even whether) formal models should be tested with statistical methods, providing little 
guidance for scholars interested in assessing formal theories with qualitative evidence. 
Likewise, although the literature on qualitative methods has seen a strong resurgence of 
activity in recent years, it does not address the particular issues that arise when seeking to 
use qualitative methods to evaluate formal theories. 
 
This methodological gap is perplexing, because in practice articles introducing a new 
formal model frequently include qualitative evidence. We surveyed all such articles 
published from 2006 to 2013 on topics in international relations and comparative politics 
from a set of prominent journals and found that qualitative evidence appeared in over half 
the articles that empirically assessed the model. Furthermore, recent critiques of prominent 
models of audience costs and of regime change have sparked vigorous debates about core 
arguments in these subfields.2 
 
Yet despite its common use, formal theorists often dismiss the value of qualitative 
evidence. Coming from the other direction, scholars using qualitative evidence to evaluate 
existing formal models do not express these qualms, but modelers often question the 
conclusions drawn by these studies. The lack of agreed-upon standards can lead scholars 
                                                
1 For examples of the former, Green and Shapiro (1994) and Shepsle (1995) provide 
influential early statements. Little and Pepinsky (2016) and Svolik (forthcoming) revisit 
the topic. For examples of the latter, see Morton (1999), Clarke and Primo (2012), and 
Granato et al. (2012). 
2 We focus on international relations and comparative politics because qualitative evidence 
has been far less prominent in formal theoretical research on American politics. 
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from different methodological backgrounds to talk past each other, hindering scientific 
progress. The applied formal modeling enterprise is now at an unsatisfying middle ground 
whereby qualitative evidence is routinely used to convince readers of the value of a model, 
yet the evidence is not presented or evaluated rigorously because it is qualitative. 
 
The frequency with which scholars from diverse methodological backgrounds use 
qualitative evidence to evaluate formal models, along with a lack of clear methodological 
guidance, suggests two options: develop better standards or abandon the practice. We argue 
for developing better standards. In particular, formal models and the increasingly 
prominent qualitative method known as process tracing share an under-recognized 
affinity—a focus on causal mechanisms—that makes process tracing a valuable tool for 
the empirical investigation of formal models. Qualitative evidence that strongly supports 
or contradicts a model’s causal processes can help to either strengthen or to weaken the 
model’s claims to empirical applicability.  Such process tracing can be as convincing as 
statistical tests.  
 
A sharp need exists for systematic standards on using process tracing to evaluate formal 
models. In this article, we take a first step toward such standards, focusing on issues that 
are unique to or are particularly important for the modeling endeavor rather than surveying 
process tracing in general. We address (1) how to use process tracing to evaluate the causal 
mechanisms embodied in a formal model, (2) what types of evidence to collect to conduct 
process tracing, and (3) how to select cases. Although we draw from existing scholarship 
on process tracing, formal models raise specific concerns including how to (or even 
whether) to test a model’s assumptions and how to assess actors’ beliefs.  Furthermore, the 
guidelines provided improve upon the somewhat ad hoc approaches used at present for 
evaluating models. By including examples in which qualitative evidence is intended to 
validate a model as well as examples in which the evidence challenges a formal model, we 
hope to engage scholars from diverse backgrounds to help bridge the gap between two 
closely related yet surprisingly disconnected research traditions. 
 
In order to discuss how to evaluate models, we must first specify what this means.   Some 
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scholars have implied that formal models have no value unless they can be and have been 
empirically tested (Hill 2005).  Others have argued that the notion of empirically testing 
theoretical models misunderstands both formal theory and empirical research (Clarke and 
Primo 2012). We take a middle ground that we believe reflects the consensus view of most 
applied modelers, but which may require some explanation for other scholars. In particular, 
we do not believe it is possible to test whether a model is true or correct in the same way 
that one can test a statistical hypothesis.  All models are simplifications and therefore are 
false in the strictest sense. However, political scientists are frequently interested in 
evaluating whether a particular model serves a useful guide to understanding a specific 
empirical setting.3 For instance, are redistributive conflicts an important driver of regime 
change?  Do audience costs play a key role in inter-state conflict? Or are these factors 
relatively unimportant?  
 
Even many who accept this stance favor quantitative over qualitative evidence. However, 
qualitative and quantitative methods can both play an important role in evaluating formal 
models.  Moreover, these two approaches complement each other at all stages of research. 
Qualitative evaluation is not simply prep work for statistical testing. Even if one believes 
that in principle any qualitative evaluation is inferior to a quantitative test with sufficient 
high-quality data (King and Powell, 2008), this is rarely the relevant issue in the real world.  
Instead, one generally chooses between imperfect methods, such as an experiment with 
uncertain external validity, an observational study with uncertain causal implications, or a 
qualitative study with only a few cases. Which approach proves more helpful for evaluating 
a model depends on what kind of data can be gathered or generated. For many topics in 
comparative politics and international relations, only a small number of cases may fit the 
scope conditions of the model. It is frequently difficult to measure key parameters and 
choice variables specified by a model or to assess actors’ intentions. Moreover, the focus 
of process tracing on evaluating the causal process differs from the goal of typical statistical 
                                                
3 Rodrik (2015) addresses the closely related but more concrete challenge of assessing 
whether a particular economic model serves as a useful guide for solving a specific policy 
problem. 
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tests, which estimate the covariational relationship between a parameter and outcome. 
Consequently, process tracing can evaluate key components of a model that conventional 
statistical tests cannot. 
 
The next section of this article demonstrates the major role qualitative evidence already 
plays in validating and evaluating formal models, and discusses problems that arise from 
the lack of rigorous standards.  The third section shows that formal modeling and process 
tracing share the common goal of understanding causal pathways, suggesting strong 
complementarities between the two endeavors.  Three sections provide a practical how-to 
guide: the fourth section discusses unique challenges that arise when considering what 
aspects of a model to evaluate and how to use process tracing effectively, the fifth section 
presents standards for gathering qualitative evidence, and the sixth section discusses case 
selection. The seventh section briefly explores what to do if the evidence goes against a 
model before we conclude.  
 
2. Formal Models and Qualitative Evidence: Problems with Current Practice 
 
The current use of qualitative evidence and formal models highlights two interrelated 
problems. First, although qualitative evidence often accompanies the introduction of new 
models, this is done with little methodological self-consciousness. Second, a gap exists in 
the methods literature. With few exceptions, the literatures on the empirical testing of 
formal models and qualitative methods do not address how to evaluate formal models using 
qualitative evidence. 
 
2.1. Contradictions in Current Practice 
To understand current practice, we surveyed six prominent political science journals and 
identified all articles with a formal model published between 2006 and 2013.4 Of the 182 
such articles that addressed topics in international relations or comparative politics, 70 
                                                
4 The Appendix provides additional details on this survey, and an accompanying document 
lists all 182 modeling articles in the survey. 
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percent (128 articles) included either a quantitative or qualitative empirical component. 
Among these 128 articles, more than half (72) provided qualitative evidence. Articles that 
provided qualitative evidence dedicated an average of two-and-a-half pages to discussing 
this evidence. This is notable when one considers the tight space limitations of journal 
articles. Moreover, in book-length expositions of formal theory, qualitative evidence has 
become almost mandatory.5 
 
This widespread use of qualitative evidence has two implications. First, since models are 
already frequently presented in conjunction with qualitative evidence, a need exists for 
more explicit standards against which to evaluate using such evidence. Second, the 
importance of qualitative evidence in the formal modeling enterprise suggests scholars with 
skills in qualitative research should be encouraged to systematically evaluate evidence 
offered for formal theories and to gather new evidence to evaluate these theories. Recent 
qualitative challenges to influential formal models, discussed below, represent an 
important step in this direction despite the counter-criticisms they have attracted. 
 
Unfortunately, scholars introducing a formal model often disparage their own qualitative 
evidence even after devoting considerable thought to this evidence. For example, in an 
article discussing political barriers to industrialization, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006b) 
devote four journal pages to country case studies that contain extensive evidence these 
cases are consistent with their model. Yet they state their “interpretations are necessarily 
speculative and more conclusive evidence requires proper statistical testing of the ideas we 
develop here” (125). Similarly, Slantchev (2011) opens a chapter-long analysis of the 
expansion of the Korean War by saying, “I remain skeptical about the extent to which we 
should trust either supporting or disconfirming evidence” (192). 
 
Certainly, these models constitute important theoretical advances regardless of how well 
                                                
5 Prominent examples from recent years include Kydd (2005), Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2006a), Slantchev (2011), Gailmard and Patty (2012), and Gingerich (2013). 
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they explain particular cases. Additionally, one might argue that these case studies are only 
intended as illustrations to make the models more accessible to non-technical readers. 
However, political scientists often link their models with historical events because they 
hope readers will find the empirical connection plausible and meaningful. Indeed, after 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006b) describe their qualitative evidence as inferior to statistical 
testing, they go on to claim their case studies show “there is direct historical evidence that 
the mechanism which is the central focus of this paper was important to nineteenth-century 
industrialization” (125). Slantchev contends his Korean War case study “challenge[s] some 
existing interpretations and show[s] how the model can illuminate some of the complex 
dynamics [of the case]” (192). These claims certainly transcend mere illustration—even 
though Slantchev carefully argues “the main purposes of [his] theoretical model [are] 
explicative and generative.” If the case studies deliver what the authors suggest, it is 
unnecessary to shroud motivation for the qualitative evidence in heavy qualifications.  
 
2.2. Shortcomings of Existing Standards 
Little methodological guidance exists for combining qualitative evidence and formal 
models. Discussions of empirically testing formal models may mention case studies in 
passing, but typically characterize them as merely a source of ideas after which 
formalization and quantitative testing can begin (e.g., Morton 1999, 133-4; Granato and 
Scioli 2004). A recent book-length challenge to the very premise of testing models has 
“little to say directly about qualitative research . . . because the conversation in political 
science in recent years has revolved around formal models and statistical models” (Clarke 
and Primo 2012, 18). The neglect has been mutual. The terms “game theory” and “formal 
theory” appear nowhere in the widely-used qualitative methods handbook Rethinking 
Social Inquiry (Brady and Collier 2010), nor in two recent book-length treatments of case 
study methods (Beach and Pedersen 2013; Rohlfing 2012). The topic receives only passing 
mention in George and Bennett’s (2005) influential guide to case study methodology (e.g., 
34-5), Goertz and Mahoney’s (2012) study of the “two cultures” of quantitative and 
qualitative research (e.g., 106), and Bennett and Checkel’s (2014) guide to process tracing. 
 
A decade-and-a-half after its launch, the Analytic Narratives project remains the most 
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prominent attempt to combine formal models and qualitative research (Bates et al. 1998).6 
Although ideas from this project remain important, more attention to integrating models 
and qualitative evidence is needed. First, the past decade has witnessed a resurgence of 
thinking on qualitative methods, producing important insights relevant for evaluating 
formal theories. Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, Bates et al. (1998) sought to 
show how formal and non-formal rational choice theories could contribute to the 
idiographic tradition by “account[ing] for particular events or outcomes” (10). Their 
concern with using models to understand particular cases differs from our broader goal of 
using qualitative evidence to evaluate existing evaluate models that aspire to greater 
generality. Our literature review suggests this objective is far more common than an 
analytic narrative’s goal of using a model to elucidate a single case. Among the articles we 
reviewed, only Nalepa (2010) claimed to follow the analytic narratives template—and this 
article includes three country case studies.7 
 
3. The Distinct Advantages of Process Tracing 
 
The broad goal of empirically evaluating a model is often conflated with using statistics to 
evaluate a model’s covariational predictions (e.g., Morton 1999; Granato et al. 2012).8 
                                                
6 Levi (2004) and Greif (2006) discuss and develop the analytic narratives methodology 
further. Buthe (2002) discusses how to effectively use historical narratives to evaluate 
models, broadly construed, but does not address the specific challenges of evaluating 
formal theories. Laitin (2002, 2003) argues for the complementarity of qualitative, 
quantitative, and formal approaches. Recent work by Kuehn (2013) and Goemans and 
Spaniel (2015) also advocate the combination of process tracing and formal models. We 
build upon these contemporaneous contributions by comprehensively marrying formal 
models with a broad spectrum of best-practice process tracing methods and by thoroughly 
summarizing existing practice. 
7 See also Lorentzen and Scoggins (2015), although they do not use the term. 
8 The qualitative analogue of this is cross-case comparisons, which can provide some basis 
to evaluate such predictions where a large sample is unavailable.  The literature on this 
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However, despite the importance of comparative statics predictions, a model is not simply 
a claim about the relationship between an X and a Y. Instead, a model embodies claims 
about a causal process by which X influences Y. This corresponds directly with the goals 
of process tracing, which involves examining “intermediate steps in a process to make 
inferences about hypotheses on how that process took place and whether and how it 
generated the outcome of interest” (Bennett and Checkel 2014: 6). That is, rather than 
trying to assess whether or not changes in X produce changes in Y, the goal is to evaluate 
a particular mechanism linking the two. The analyst uses many facts from a case, 
sometimes called “causal process observations,” to evaluate the plausibility of a particular 
causal mechanism (Collier, Brady, and Seawright 2004). 
 
Modeling and process tracing are also closely related in the kind of thinking they require. 
Using process tracing requires a scholar to “clarify as much as possible . . . [w]hich actors 
should have known, said, and did what, and when” (Bennett and Checkel 2014: 30). By 
definition, a model does this. Indeed, writing down and solving a model often forces the 
modeler to ask new questions about what choices are available to decision-makers and at 
what points, what their motivations and goals might be, and what information they had 
available to them. These considerations generate numerous implications about events in a 
particular case that can be evaluated empirically, whether by the scholar that produced the 
model or by others with knowledge of relevant cases. The shared concern with 
understanding the processes leading to an outcome makes process tracing a natural tool to 
use when evaluating a formal model. 
 
Current practice reflects this affinity between causal mechanisms and process tracing. In 
our survey of research articles, 12 percent presented qualitative cross-case comparisons 
while almost three times as many (34 percent) provided qualitative evidence focused on 
                                                
approach is extensive, dating back in political science to Lijphart’s (1971) article on the 
comparative method. Mahoney (2010), Tarrow (2010) and Slater and Ziblatt (2013) 
provide more recent statements that could easily translate to testing formal models, so we 
will not discuss this approach here. 
 9 
mechanisms. This took two forms. About one-quarter (23 percent) of the articles offered 
qualitative evidence to justify key assumptions. Just under one-fifth (18 percent) of articles 
included detailed case studies, averaging almost four pages in length. Despite disclaimers 
of the type mentioned above, these case studies are clearly intended to demonstrate that a 
model offers insight into the events discussed. 
 
One view might be that such case studies are merely preliminary work, throwaway 
“suggestive” evidence that serves as a placeholder until the day when the real work of 
statistical testing can be conducted.  This is not our view.  No single test, whether 
quantitative or qualitative, can be conclusive, but each moves the needle (in a loosely 
Bayesian sense) by increasing or decreasing our confidence that a model captures key 
aspects of a particular empirical context.  Moreover, the shared concern of models and 
process tracing with causal mechanisms—as distinct from narrowly defined causal 
relationships between two variables—means that a good process tracing exercise can be as 
or even more valuable than a statistical test for assessing the empirical value or limitations 
of a model. By contrast, standard statistical evaluations of models often fail to provide 
insight either into the empirical validity of key assumptions that generate the model’s 
comparative statics predictions, or into a model’s intervening implications. 
 
Process tracing also offers several practical advantages for evaluating models, which the 
following sections discuss in detail. Quite often, off-the-shelf datasets do not adequately 
measure key parameters and choice variables. Even more rarely do they provide insight 
into actors’ perceptions of their strategic setting. A close examination of a smaller number 
of cases can be preferable to a large-N test with more questionable measures (see Section 
5). Furthermore, especially in models with country-level implications, the number of cases 
that correspond to the scope conditions of the formal model might be small enough to make 
conventional statistical tests infeasible (see Section 6). Finally, if a model falls short in a 
particular case, then the kind of information provided by detailed process tracing plays a 
crucial role in generating new formal models (Section 7). 
 
Our intent here is not to advocate abandoning statistical tests in favor of process tracing. 
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The value-added of quantitative evaluation is well-known.  Our point is simply that process 
tracing has distinct strengths for evaluating formal models that make it just as important 
for assessing formal models as statistical tests. 
 
However, using process tracing to evaluate formal models raises particular challenges that 
the qualitative methods literature does not consider. The remainder of this article discusses 
characteristics that distinguish convincing process tracing evaluations of formal models 
from unconvincing ones.  We illustrate these features with examples from research that 
introduces a new model and provides qualitative evidence to support it, as well as from 
research that assesses existing formal models. We focus on three key areas in qualitative 
methods research: how to evaluate mechanisms, how to gather evidence, and which cases 
to select. Table 1 summarizes the standards. 
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Table 1: A Checklist for Evaluating a Formal Model using Process Tracing 
Topic Aspects to consider Advice 
Evaluating 
mechanisms 
Assumptions •   Distinguish between a model’s assumptions 
and implications 
•   Recognize all assumptions are 
simplifications 
•   Assess how changing the assumption could 
change the implications 
Implications about the 
causal process 
•   Identify observable implications of the 
causal process implied by the model 
•   Evaluate one implication across more cases 
or many implications in one case 
Alternative explanations •   Examine evidence that distinguishes among 
alternative explanations (formalized or not) 
•   To challenge a model most effectively, 
present an alternative or a sketch of one 
Gathering 
evidence 
Accurate measurement •   Take advantage of small sample size to 
carefully measure variables 
•   Consider multiple ways to measure key 
variables 
•   Provide detailed coding rules to facilitate 
replication 
Transcript evidence •   Use transcript evidence to provide insight 
into actors’ information, beliefs, and 
perceptions 
•   Recognize that speech is also a strategic 
choice 
Selecting cases Fit with model •   Select cases that match key assumptions of 
the model as closely as possible 
“Biased” selection •   Look for cases that isolate the model’s 
mechanisms relative to alternatives 
•   Look for cases likely to produce relevant 
transcript evidence 
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4. Using Process Tracing to Evaluate Mechanisms from a Formal Theory 
 
In order to empirically evaluate the mechanisms from a formal model, it is useful to 
distinguish between two different objects of investigation usually conflated in the process 
tracing literature. First, a model makes assumptions about the causal process. Formal 
models specify what choices players must make, in what order, with what information, and 
with what objectives. Second, a model’s assumptions create observable implications for 
the causal process, including which choices and outcomes should be observed. 
 
Let us begin with a prominent example, Acemoglu and Robinson’s model of regime change 
(2006a). Their core model assumes that all redistribution occurs through a flat tax, whose 
proceeds are handed out equally to all members of society. It also assumes that in a 
democracy, this tax rate will be determined through a one-person-one-vote system. By 
contrast, it implies that the wealthy will prefer autocracy to democracy and the poor will 
prefer the opposite, and that given the opportunity, each group may mobilize politically to 
achieve its desired regime. These two assumptions and two implications can each be 
evaluated using process tracing. Our confidence in the empirical value of any model 
depends significantly in our evaluation of assumptions like these even though they cannot 
be statistically tested.9 
 
Below, we first discuss how to use process tracing to evaluate a model’s assumptions and 
implications, and then discuss the importance of comparing the model’s mechanisms to 
alternative explanations. These topics constitute the core elements of using process tracing 
to evaluate formal models, assuming the researcher has already chosen cases and collected 
data (discussed later in the article). 
 
 
                                                
9 By contrast, another implication of this model is that countries with high income 
inequality should be less likely to democratize. This kind of implication about outcomes is 
natural to test statistically. 
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4.1. Evaluating Assumptions About the Causal Process 
Evaluating a model’s assumptions is a particularly contentious issue. At one extreme, 
Milton Friedman (1966 [1953]: 14) argues assumptions should never be evaluated because 
they are not meant to be accurate descriptions of reality. Instead, Friedman asserts that we 
should restrict attention solely to a model’s predictions. But this position does not help to 
adjudicate between different models that explain the same set of facts, nor does it provide 
guidance for revising models with weak predictive power.  At the other extreme, Bates et 
al. (1998: 14) present as a key criterion of a good analytic narrative that “the assumptions 
fit the facts.” Yet whether an assumption fits the facts is also a poor standard. All models 
and indeed all theories inherently simplify and therefore contain assumptions that do not 
exactly “fit the facts,” so this standard provides an easy target for unproductive critiques.10 
 
Developing a satisfactory middle ground between Friedman and Bates et al. is crucial. As 
noted above, about one-quarter of the articles in our sample use qualitative evidence to 
justify the model’s assumptions. In other words, the authors of these models view the 
empirical appropriateness of their assumptions as an important criterion of evaluation.  
 
Although it is impossible to draw a bright line between satisfactory and unsatisfactory 
assumptions, we propose two criteria that establish a pragmatic middle ground.11 The most 
compelling critique replaces a disputed modeling assumption with an alternative 
assumption that (a) more closely matches the empirical context in question and (b) 
significantly changes the model’s conclusions. The first criterion captures the importance 
of empirical relevance, but the second criterion rules out easy criticisms that a formal model 
                                                
10 Healy (2015) provides a recent discussion of similar issues in sociology. 
11 Inexact standards are not limited to qualitative methods. For example, there are only 
gradations of plausibility assessing whether a natural experiment is well-designed or 
whether a lab experiment has external validity. Clarke and Primo (2012: 97-100) provide 
a broader discussion of “the illusion of precise standards” for evaluating a formal model. 
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simplifies.12 Any theory, formal or not, simplifies the social world to facilitate a tractable 
analysis. Individuals frequently behave in what appear to be irrational ways. States, parties, 
corporations, interest groups, and other organizations do not always behave as unitary 
actors. People’s beliefs about the world do not exactly follow Bayes’ rule. Demonstrating 
these facts tells us very little about whether a model is a useful simplification for 
understanding an important strategic tradeoff. 
 
Other assumptions, however, are more important to justify when presenting a model or to 
evaluate when critiquing a model. For example, Svolik (2009) shows how a moral hazard 
model provides insights into a strategic interaction between a dictator that desires to 
concentrate power and a ruling coalition that attempts to maintain a power-sharing 
arrangement. A key assumption in this model is that the principal (the ruling coalition) 
receives informative but imperfect signals about the agent’s (dictator’s) actions and must 
reward or punish based on this information (by attempting a coup or not). Svolik 
demonstrates the empirical relevance of this assumption by providing examples in which 
leaders’ attempts to consolidate power generated these signals. In the Soviet Union, 
Lavrentiy Beria merged formal ministries after Stalin’s death to concentrate more power 
in his hands. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein gradually replaced earlier supporters with loyalists 
from his hometown. 
 
With regard to critiquing a model’s assumptions, it is easier to evaluate the impact of 
changing an assumption if two competing formal models differ only on that one 
assumption. Although this is rarely the case, we can still make a more subjective judgment 
of whether a particular change in assumptions would likely meaningfully change the 
conclusions. Consider, for example, recent evaluations of audience cost models with 
qualitative evidence. This family of models builds on Fearon (1994, 1997), who presented 
a model of international disputes in which “the side with a stronger domestic audience (e.g., 
                                                
12 For example, Elster’s (2000) review of Bates et al. (1998) attacks the authors for 
assuming rational behavior and for treating collectives as unitary actors, among other 
issues. 
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a democracy) is always less likely to back down” (1994: 577). Audience costs, or the cost 
a leader would pay for backing down in a dispute, more rapidly lock democratic leaders 
into a stated position. Snyder and Borghard (2011) challenge this theory in part because 
they disagree with the key assumption that “publics care a great deal about consistency 
between threats and deeds, independent of their preferences on policy substance” (439), 
among others. 
 
Snyder and Borghard therefore examine crises in which democratic leaders made threats 
and failed to carry them out. Although they only found one case in which domestic 
audiences imposed no costs on the leader, they provide considerable evidence against the 
theory even in the apparently confirmatory cases: domestic audiences punished leaders 
only when those audiences were already pro-war. This contrasts with the model’s 
assumption that audiences will punish leaders primarily for failing to back their threats up. 
Of course, proponents of audience costs can counter that this evidence does not fully rule 
out the counterfactual implied by the model: those leaders had weaker public support after 
making these threats and then backing down than if they had never made the threats in the 
first place (Fearon 2013). Nonetheless, the lack of evidence for this effect suggests the 
tradeoff assumed in the formal model is not highly relevant in the cases examined. 
 
Regardless of one’s assessment of Snyder and Borghard’s evidence,13 their critique 
satisfies our standard for how to assess an assumption. The assumption that audiences want 
their leaders to back up threats independently of whether they actually believe the prize is 
worth fighting for is not merely a simplification, but instead is fundamental to the 
theoretical logic of this family of models. If this assumption is rarely empirically relevant 
or its effect is negligible in practice, then audience cost models offer little additional 
explanatory leverage relative to a simpler theory in which democratic leaders largely 
follow the electorate’s preferences. 
                                                
13 For a vigorous discussion of this article and the closely related Trachtenberg (2012a), 
see Schultz (2012), Slantchev (2012), Trachtenberg (2012b), and other symposium articles 
in the same issue of Security Studies. 
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4.2. Evaluating Observable Implications About the Causal Process 
Process tracing can also evaluate whether events from empirical cases match a model’s 
implications. Even if the covariational pattern between a parameter and outcome fits the 
model’s predictions, strong empirical support for the model requires evidence of the 
intervening causal process implied by the model. The absence of such evidence provides 
grounds to question whether the mechanisms implied by the model help to explain 
empirical cases. Observable implications can be assessed either by examining small 
numbers of implications across a larger number of cases or by examining many 
implications within a single case. 
 
For example, in Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2006a) regime transition model, high 
inequality (independent variable) affects reversions from democratic rule (dependent 
variable) because the rich want to end high taxation the poor imposes on them (intervening 
variable). Haggard and Kaufman (2012) measure these three key variables for a large 
sample of democratic reversions. They find that of the seven democratic reversions in high-
inequality countries, only two cases exhibited evidence that elites ended democracy to 
prevent redistribution (509). In other cases, redistribution either played a negligible role or 
populist autocrats came to power offering more redistribution than had occurred under 
democracy. These findings would cast doubt on the empirical relevance of Acemoglu and 
Robinson’s theory for explaining regime transitions even if the predicted correlation 
between independent and dependent variables were robust. 
 
Alternatively, one can evaluate more mechanisms implied by a model with a single case. 
For example, Dunning (2008) argues that under certain conditions resource wealth 
(independent variable) can promote democratic stability (dependent variable) by mitigating 
the wealthy elite’s concerns that a democratic government pandering to the masses will 
expropriate their income (intervening variable). Dunning’s qualitative analysis of 
Venezuela starts by closely tracing the rise and fall of oil rents and of democratic stability. 
However, he goes beyond this qualitative analogue of time series analysis to provide 
various pieces of evidence that the core mechanisms implied by the model were operating. 
 17 
For instance, when oil rents were high, elites did not object to the high levels of public 
benefits provided to the masses (163-6). This is consistent with the model’s implication 
that elites should only protest public spending funded by high tax rates. Similarly, as oil 
rents fell, Dunning shows politics became polarized around classes and redistributive 
conflicts and ultimately facilitated the rise of the populist Hugo Chavez (166-83).14 
 
4.3. Examining Alternative Explanations 
Whether validating or challenging a model, process tracing should also address alternative 
hypotheses. Bennett (2010) places this consideration at the heart of the method: “Process 
tracing involves the examination of ‘diagnostic’ pieces of evidence within a case that 
contribute to supporting or overturning alternative explanatory hypotheses . . . What 
matters is not the amount of evidence, but its contribution to adjudicating among alternative 
hypotheses” (208-9). 
 
For example, in a study on trust in international relations, Kydd (2005) formalizes Robert 
Jervis’s well-known spiral model. One important implication of the formalization is that 
spirals of “unjustified mistrust”—circumstances in which both states are security-seekers 
that nevertheless view each other as expansionist and threatening—should be quite rare. 
Kydd then evaluates this model in the context of the origins of the Cold War between 1945 
and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. Kydd directly addresses many existing 
explanations that historians and political scientists have posited for these events, which 
greatly increases confidence that the model provides valid insights into this important 
series of events. Similarly, Slantchev (2011) argues the expansion of the Korean War 
resulted from deliberately ambiguous military signals made by the Chinese, and explicitly 
evaluates this explanation against previous analyses that had attributed the war to an 
American failure to accurately read Chinese intentions. 
 
Frequently, however, political scientists introducing a new model often provide evidence 
consistent with their own explanation but do not consider existing alternative hypotheses. 
                                                
14 Lorentzen (2014) provides another example. 
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Additionally, even when scholars do consider alternative explanations, they often only 
address rival formal models. For instance, Miller and Schofield (2003) set their explanation 
for the gradual shift in American party alignments over the past century against formal 
models they interpret as implying “chaos” (constantly changing or unpredictable policy 
positions) or “convergence” (policies fixed at the median voter), but do not address any 
competing non-formalized explanations for this shift.15 
 
Evaluating alternative explanations is also vital when challenging formal models. Judging 
a model against the ideal of perfect consistency with all available facts rather than against 
a specific alternative explanation can result in unconstructive critiques of oversimplified 
assumptions, such as appeared in Elster’s (2000) critique of Analytic Narratives. This 
concern may even raise questions about more pertinent critiques. Schultz (2012) and 
Slantchev (2012) both argue the arguments against audience costs theories made in 
Trachtenberg (2012a) and Snyder and Borghard (2011) are weakened because they do not 
explicitly delineate an internally consistent alternative explanation, although Trachtenberg 
(2012b) rejects this criticism. 
 
5. Gathering Evidence to Evaluate a Model’s Mechanisms 
Process tracing both permits and requires more attention to gathering evidence than is 
generally possible in statistical analyses. This has two implications.  First, key variables 
should be operationalized and measured carefully and precisely.  Second, scholars should 
use a broader range of evidence, such as transcript evidence (the public or private 
communications of actors directly involved in the case). 
 
5.1. Carefully Measuring Key Variables 
Properly measured variables are a necessary foundation for any convincing empirical 
analysis. Models, especially in international relations, frequently encompass difficult-to-
measure concepts such as actors’ perceptions of the distribution of power. It may be 
preferable to study covariational patterns among a small number of personally measured 
                                                
15 Mayhew (2000) reviews this extensive literature. 
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cases rather than to use an off-the-shelf measure that does not adequately measure the 
underlying concept—even if the latter facilitates a larger sample. Ideally, these variables 
should be measured in multiple ways to assess whether different measures produce 
divergent findings. If they do, then it is important to defend why one measure should be 
preferred over others. Although this advice applies for any case study, researchers 
presenting qualitative support for their own models rarely consider multiple measures. 
 
Slantchev’s (2011) Korean War case study in his book on military threats illustrates the 
importance of considering different measures. This study operationalizes the “distribution 
of power” in terms of the number of troops in the theater of operations, which in this case 
means Chinese forces in Manchuria and U.S.-led United Nations forces on the Korean 
Peninsula. Because China enjoyed an almost 70 percent share of troops in-theater in 
September 1950, this operationalization implies China would have deterred the United 
States from crossing the parallel by issuing a clear military threat at this time. By October, 
however, since China had as little as 57 percent of the troops in-theater, it would appear 
that even a clear Chinese threat to intervene would not have deterred the United States. 
 
However, this conclusion is sensitive to the choice of measure. Consider two reasonable 
alternative operationalizations of the distribution of power. On the one hand, if military 
capabilities and odds of victory are measured in terms of China’s entire standing army of 
more than 5 million soldiers in 1950 that it could bring to bear in Korea, set against all U.S. 
forces in Asia, China should have been able to continue to deter the United States even in 
October. On the other hand, the qualitative inferiority of the Chinese army suggests that 
China would not have been able to deter the United States even in September with only its 
troops in Manchuria.  The Chinese army was primarily a guerilla force consisting of light 
infantry and some artillery, and the American army had a clear advantage in armored 
vehicles, air support, and other technologies. Because these different measures of power 
yield different predictions than Slantchev’s operationalization, his otherwise careful 
presentation of evidence is less compelling than it would have been had he addressed 
whether his chosen measure improves upon these alternatives. 
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Considering multiple measures is equally important when arguing against the empirical 
applicability of a model. Haggard and Kaufmann (2012) strengthen their critique of 
redistributional regime change theories by considering a wide variety of inequality 
measures. This reduces the possibility of counting a case against the theory because it 
scored low on one inequality measure but not another. Although the authors do not provide 
multiple measures when creating a new variable—a coding of whether redistributive 
conflict plausibly played a causal role in a particular transition—they provide transparent 
coding rules and detailed documentation for how each case was coded (Haggard, Kaufman, 
and Teo 2012). 
 
5.2. Using Transcript Evidence to Assess Actors’ Beliefs 
Effective process tracing also requires and facilitates using a broader range of evidence 
than is typical of statistical analyses. In particular, when treated with appropriate caution, 
transcript evidence—what decision-makers in the case and those around them actually said 
or wrote—can help assess whether actors appeared to perceive key tradeoffs from the 
formal model and their perceptions of which undesirable outcomes they anticipated and 
took steps to avoid.16  
 
For example, Goemans and Fey (2009) leverage transcript evidence when using process 
tracing to evaluate a model that explains risky behavior by national leaders in international 
conflicts. Their model suggests leaders with weak domestic support will take military 
actions that decrease the overall probability of winning a war if those actions 
simultaneously increase the odds their country will decisively win the war—the only 
outcome in which the tenuously supported leaders will stay in power. Here, the key 
intervening variable is how leaders perceive their actions will affect variance in the war’s 
outcome. Empirically, they examine Germany’s decision in January 1917 to return to 
unrestricted submarine warfare. Consistent with the model’s implications, Goemans and 
                                                
16 In other words, what were their beliefs about outcomes off the equilibrium path? 
Weingast (1996) provides a lengthier discussion of how scrutinizing off-the-equilibrium 
path behavior in game theoretic models can inform historical analysis. 
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Fey provide evidence from contemporary speeches, reports, and armistice negotiations that 
German leaders risked this gamble because without additional action Germany would not 
have been able to achieve a deal favorable enough for its leaders to keep their jobs—even 
though this gamble lowered Germany’s expected settlement terms by raising the likelihood 
the U.S. would enter the war.17 
 
Of course, individuals often have incentives to lie to justify their actions. This highlights 
the importance of addressing possible biases when presenting transcript evidence—which 
the formal model may provide insight into. It would go too far to treat direct statements 
from political actors as necessary evidence for a particular interpretation of their actions. 
Gartzke and Lupu (2012) argue that critics of audience cost theory make this mistake by 
treating the lack of instances in which political leaders admit they were trying to create 
audience costs as evidence against the theory. It may not be wise for political leaders to 
admit, even after the fact, that they were trying to make war over an issue unavoidable. Or 
they may simply not be introspective enough to write down their thoughts afterwards. 
 
Nonetheless, statements made after a political actor steps down from a formal post can 
provide important supportive evidence.  For example, Johns’ (2007) model of international 
bureaucrats with multiple principals suggests that when one principal has a strong outside 
option that gives it substantial bargaining leverage over the final outcome, a bureaucrat 
whose preferences are more moderate will disclose less information than it would have if 
either (a) both principals were equally powerful or (b) its preferences were more closely 
aligned with those of the stronger principal. Johns supports this finding by quoting UN 
representative Hans Blix, who admitted to obscuring important information when reporting 
the results of his weapons inspections in Iraq to the UN Security Council because he knew 
U.S. preferences would likely determine the outcome. 
 
Overall, transcript evidence offers a unique opportunity to assess actors’ beliefs. The 
potential pitfalls of transcript evidence indicates that researchers should carefully interpret 
                                                
17 In a similar vein, Lorentzen (2013) uses evidence from interviews with Chinese 
protesters to validate a model of protest as an information gathering institution. 
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this evidence and acknowledge that these interpretations are subject to debate. But these 
pitfalls do not mean that such evidence should be disregarded and cannot be used (contra 
Bates et al. 1998, 698 and Beck 2010). Furthermore, the difficulty of incorporating such 
evidence into a statistical framework highlights another distinct advantage of qualitative 
tests. 
 
6. Selecting Cases to Isolate the Model’s Mechanisms 
The above discussion presumes the analyst has chosen cases for which we should expect a 
model’s assumptions and implications to find support. However, no model will provide 
insight into all cases. Qualitative methodologists have made notable progress in the past 
decade by articulating different ways cases can be selected and by explaining how 
particular case selection procedures serve different research goals.18 However, distinct 
issues arise when evaluating formal models, leading us to make two recommendations for 
selecting cases. First, the case should match the model’s assumptions as closely as possible. 
Second, and contrary to standard statistical practices, sampling on particular values of the 
main independent and/or dependent variables may be more likely to distinguish the model 
from alternatives and to yield useful transcript evidence. 
 
First, recommending that cases selected should match the model’s assumptions as closely 
as possible resembles the goal of choosing cases that fit the model’s scope conditions. 
Although no case will perfectly match the precise technical setup of the model—nor will a 
bright line distinguish cases that are conclusively in or out of scope—a model should be 
more likely to correspond with empirical cases for which the model’s assumptions match 
more closely. This provides an important practical advantage of process tracing. For many 
important theories and models, the total number of cases meeting this criterion will often 
yield low-powered statistical tests.  This is particularly true for the country-level theories 
that are often the focus of comparative politics and international relations research.  
                                                
18 Lieberman (2005), Seawright and Gerring (2008), and Fearon and Laitin (2008) discuss 
how to select cases from a large dataset after an initial statistical analysis is complete. 
Bennett and Elman (2006) survey earlier developments in this literature. 
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For instance, Slantchev (2011) solves his model of military threats in the context of two-
party conflicts for reasons of tractability. The model likely offers insights into threat-
making in conflicts with three or more actors. However, because the model neglects 
additional dynamics that might arise with more parties, Slantchev examines the two-party 
setting of U.S.-Chinese interactions in the expansion of the Korean War. Similarly, 
Dunning (2010) presents a model of endogenous oil rents for which the tradeoffs from the 
model should be relevant in “democratic polities in which the prospect of continued and 
regular elections is relatively high” (382). His case of Venezuela meets these conditions, 
whereas the actions of authoritarian rulers who maintain their position via family 
succession rules or through brute force may not be well-explained by a model that assumes 
electoral competition. For both studies, examining cases that fit less well with the model’s 
assumptions would have been less useful. 
 
Second, sampling on particular values of the independent and/or dependent variables is 
often the best strategy for assessing whether a model’s mechanisms help to explain known 
outcomes (Collier and Mahoney 1996),19 in contrast to case selection principles derived 
from statistical research (Geddes 1990). A model’s predictions may only be distinguished 
from prominent alternative explanations for certain values of the independent variable(s). 
Similarly, actors may only be likely to produce transcript evidence relevant for 
distinguishing the model from alternatives when certain conditions are present. 
 
Goemans and Fey’s (2009: 35) analysis of Germany’s strategy in the final years of the First 
World War illustrates this approach. As discussed, they use transcript evidence to show 
that the logic of their model explains the outcome of risky escalation to unrestricted 
submarine warfare better than alternative explanations assuming incomplete information. 
In particular, they summarize transcript evidence in which German leaders expressed fears 
                                                
19 Gerring (2007) suggests that cases of this type be referred to as “pathway” cases and 
offers additional useful suggestions on their selection and usage. This approach is related 
to but distinct from Eckstein’s (1975) conception of “most likely” cases. 
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about whether they would be able to stay in office if they were unable to bring about a 
“sufficient peace” that would yield material spoils of war for the German public. By 
contrast, we would not expect to find transcript evidence that would distinguish their theory 
from alternatives in cases with different values of either the independent or dependent 
variable. To see this, suppose the leaders would retain their positions regardless of the war 
outcome. Even if the officials explicitly stated they never considered escalating war tactics, 
this transcript evidence would not distinguish Goemans and Fey’s model from an 
alternative explanation that leaders never take risky gambles. Furthermore, we would 
certainly not expect secure leaders to produce transcript evidence about whether they 
would consider taking a risky gamble were their jobs less secure. Finally, regardless of 
leaders’ job status, if Goemans and Fey studied a minor power that could not have escalated 
a war on its own, once again we would not expect to encounter transcript evidence useful 
for evaluating their institutionally induced escalation model. 
 
Similarly, Dunning’s (2008) model discussed earlier implies greater resource wealth may 
tend to preserve rather than weaken democracy for a particular value of a conditioning 
factor: non-resource income is distributed very unequally. Examining the case of 
Venezuela, an oil-rich country with high non-resource inequality, he finds considerable 
evidence that the association predicted by the model is generated by the mechanism in the 
model. But suppose he had instead analyzed a country with no resource wealth, or a country 
with resource wealth but a very even income distribution. Table 2 compares the predictions 
of Dunning’s model with Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2006a) model under different 
combinations of the inequality and resource variables: 
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Table 2. Comparing Predictions from Dunning and Acemoglu/Robinson 
 
Case 
Type 
Non-Resource 
Income Inequality 
Natural 
Resources 
A&R Predict Elites 
Fear Redistribution? 
Dunning Predicts Elites 
Fear Redistribution? 
1 Low Low No No 
2 Low High No No 
3 High Low Yes Yes 
4 High High Yes No 
 
In case types 1 through 3, Dunning’s model does not offer different predictions than 
Acemoglu and Robinson. Therefore, although Dunning may have found no evidence that 
elites were using resource wealth to mitigate redistributive pressures in these countries—
consistent with his model—such a finding would do little to enhance our confidence that 
his model offers novel insights. Only case type 4 distinguishes Dunning’s model from 
Acemoglu and Robinson. 
 
These standards for case selection are useful both when a researcher is trying to provide 
initial empirical support for a model and when the goal is to challenge an established model. 
When developing a model, finding strong evidence for the model’s explanatory power in 
one or a few cases is sufficient to make the argument that it warrants further empirical 
investigation. Similarly, when the research goal is to evaluate an existing model, attention 
should be focused on cases where its processes should be most apparent because the 
model’s proponents may rightfully dismiss contrary evidence from less pertinent cases. 
 
Both recent challenges to audience costs models follow this principle. Snyder and Borghard 
(2011: 444) survey all post-1945 international crises involving the United States, and then 
focus on cases in which a democratic leader made a public threat and domestic public 
opinion was mobilized around the issue. Democratic leaders’ anticipation of audience costs 
should also affect their escalation decision even if they do not make such threats, but it 
would presumably be more difficult to find evidence of these costs. Trachtenberg (2012a) 
instead restricts attention to great power crises that involve a democracy and do not end in 
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war. Both studies aim to evaluate the model in a best-case scenario by looking for cases 
that fit the scope conditions of the model as closely as possible, minimize confounding 
factors, and in which the mechanisms of the model should be isolated from alternative 
explanations. 
 
Related, as discussed, Haggard and Kaufman (2012) examine every regime transition 
worldwide from 1980 to 2000 to assess redistributive regime transition models. These 
theories have implications for politically stable regimes as well, but there are two good 
reasons to focus on transitions. First, a society at the crux of transition is most likely to 
produce transcript evidence useful for assessing how important are inequality-driven social 
tensions.  Second, the originators of these models advance general claims: Boix (2003) 
aims to offer “a theory of political transitions and regime choice” (10) and Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2006a) offer a “framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of 
democracy” (front matter). Such claims of broad applicability has led these models to be 
so influential in our thinking. But by the same token, failure to find evidence of the models’ 
mechanisms in nearly every recent transition case suggests either that their scope is more 
sharply delimited than initially claimed, or that the strategic factors and tradeoffs they 
highlight are considerably smaller in magnitude than had been thought.  
 
Notably, despite Snyder and Borghard’s, Trachtenberg’s, and Haggard and Kaufman’s 
concerted attempts to sample cases in which the model’s mechanisms are highly visible, 
much of the pushback against their conclusions also focuses on case selection. Boix (2013: 
12), for example, argues that the inequality/redistribution link is most important and 
therefore more easily observed in much earlier democratizations, whereas this mechanism 
is less central and more easily obscured by confounding factors in regime changes during 
the later period Haggard and Kaufman examine. Similarly, Slantchev (2012) defends 
audience cost theory by pointing out that: “in several of the cases Trachtenberg studies, 
one would not even expect [audience cost theory’s] mechanism to be at work for the simple 
reason that both sides had eschewed the use of force” (377). Case selection plays a central 
role in these debates, highlighting the need for careful attention to scope conditions and the 
likely prominence of a model’s central mechanism in a case. 
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7. What to Do When Process Tracing Does Not Support a Model 
Having addressed how to assess a model, the question remains of what to do if the evidence 
goes against it. We argue that qualitative evidence plays an equally important role as 
quantitative evidence in updating our confidence about the empirical relevance of a model.  
Moreover, the kind of qualitative evidence that results from process tracing can be even 
more useful than quantitative findings for generating new theories or for revising existing 
ones. 
 
The debate about Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2006) and Boix’s (2003) redistributive 
models of regime transitions illustrates these arguments. Above we summarized Haggard 
and Kaufman’s (2012) research, which found little evidence from cases in recent decades 
for the central idea that redistributive pressures have affected regime transitions. Slater, 
Smith, and Nair (2014) have additionally shown that core assumptions do not find support 
in Southeast Asian cases that otherwise fit the models’ scope conditions: the military is not 
a consistent ally of economic elites, nor do many post-colonial states have the 
infrastructural capacity to implement widespread redistribution. This qualitative evidence 
is crucial for casting doubt on some key assumptions and implications of these models and 
therefore complements statistical tests that demonstrate weak support for the core 
comparative statics predictions linking inequality and regime type (Acemoglu et al. 2013, 
Soifer 2013). The sum of this evidence strongly supports the conclusion that 
redistributional pressure is not a central factor to analyze for understanding modern regime 
changes.  
 
What should be done if process tracing casts doubt on the empirical relevance of a model? 
The next step is to work toward a new theory that will serve as a better guide to 
understanding the particular context.  Regardless of whether one plans to formalize the 
theory, further progress will require careful thought about which assumptions were 
empirically irrelevant in the rejected model and what alternative assumptions might serve 
better. This will usually be founded in qualitative case knowledge, which highlights 
another distinct advantage of process tracing research. For instance, one could take Slater, 
 28 
Smith, and Nair’s (2014) findings and explore the implications of models with an 
independent military, or in which the total amount of possible redistribution is greatly 
circumscribed. Or one could build off Haggard and Kaufmann’s (2012) observation that 
autocrats may build support through populist redistributive strategies.   
 
By contrast, statistical findings provide little guidance for future theorizing. Suppose one 
does not accept that qualitative evidence can meaningfully cast empirical doubt on a model, 
but accepts Acemoglu et al.’s (2013) conclusion that inequality has “no robust causal 
relationship” with regime transitions in any methodologically sound statistical analysis. 
Where should one go next? Qualitative research, most likely including some form of 
process tracing, will still be required in order to lay foundations for a better theory. 
 
As a final point about the role of models in the larger social science enterprise, models have 
many uses and even “wrong” models can be valuable in moving our thinking forward.20 
The central issues raised by redistributive transition models and some of the techniques 
used to analyze them will play an important part in subsequent theories developed to 
explain political transitions (Boix 2013) and even other topics.21 Moreover, the difficulty 
of conclusively evaluating the empirical relevance of a particular model and the value a 
model can have even if it falls short empirically demonstrate why we should reject the 
position that formal theories should not be published for wider consideration until they 
have been empirically tested.22  The highly informative debates about redistributive causes 
of regime transitions and about audience costs simply would not have been possible 
without the parsimonious and clear formal frameworks provided by these foundational 
formal models. 
 
 
                                                
20 Powell (1999: 23-39) and Clarke and Primo (2012) discuss these points more thoroughly. 
21 For instance, the role of natural resources in preventing civil wars (Paine 2016). 
22 Hill (2005), for instance, asserts that this view was near-universal among reviewers for 
the American Journal of Political Science for at least a period of time. 
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8. Conclusion 
Although there has been extensive discussion of when and how to link formal theories and 
statistical evidence, the role of qualitative evidence in evaluating formal theories has been 
largely neglected. Nevertheless, as we have demonstrated, using qualitative evidence to 
validate formal models is actually common practice among formal theorists—particularly 
in international relations and comparative politics—and qualitative scholars are also 
becoming more actively engaged in evaluating formal models. This is not accidental, but 
results from the focus that case studies, especially those using process tracing, share with 
game-theoretic models on understanding causal mechanisms. Yet rather than capitalize on 
this affinity, scholars versed in formal theory are often vague about or explicitly denigrate 
inferences drawn from qualitative evidence, leaving readers with no clear standard by 
which to judge the evidence provided. Relatedly, many formal theorists appear to be largely 
unaware of the substantial body of recent research refining and advancing techniques for 
qualitative analysis. On the other side, the qualitative methods literature pays almost no 
attention to the specific concerns that arise with empirically assessing formal models using 
case studies. Modelers and qualitative scholars often seem to talk past each other for the 
simple reason that criteria for empirical validation remain unclear. 
 
This disconnect between formal models and current qualitative research is unfortunate. 
Both approaches share a common concern with mechanisms underlying causal 
relationships, and would benefit from greater integration in the collective effort to 
understand political phenomena. Towards this end, we have offered a new set of practical 
standards for using process tracing to evaluate formal models. These standards apply both 
to formal modelers aiming to convince a broader audience that a new model has empirical 
purchase in substantively important settings, and to scholars who seek to evaluate the 
empirical value of a model. This article represents one step in bridging the gap between 
two vibrant but often disconnected intellectual communities. 
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Appendix: Survey of Evidence Accompanying Formal Models 
 
To quantify how frequently and in what manner qualitative evidence is used in conjunction 
with formal theory in studies of comparative politics and international relations, we 
surveyed all articles with formal models published from 2006 to 2013 across seven major 
journals, including both general interest journals and ones focused on these subfields. 
Articles were identified in the American Journal of Political Science, American Political 
Science Review, Comparative Political Studies, International Organization, Journal of 
Politics, and World Politics. Comparative Politics was also surveyed but no articles were 
identified in this journal during this period that used formal models. Articles were classified 
as having formal models and therefore included in our survey if they included analytical 
propositions and specified an equilibrium concept. Rational actor assumptions were not 
required, but models analyzed using primarily computational techniques were excluded for 
simplicity, although their empirical evaluation faces many similar issues. To slightly 
narrow the scope of our study, we also excluded articles that explicitly addressed 
institutions unique to American politics, or which referred only to examples or empirical 
studies from American politics. One hundred eighty-two articles fit these criteria. Our rules 
for coding the empirical methods used in these articles follow. The coding database lists 
all 182 modeling articles in our survey and is posted on www.peterlorentzen.com. 
 
Coding rules 
•   Quantitative empirical evaluation: The article offers statistical evidence that an 
implication of the model is borne out, usually with an explicit hypothesis test and 
confidence interval. Such claims generally involve original data collection or 
analysis, and follow the presentation of the model’s key results. References to 
previously established statistical regularities were not counted. 
•   Qualitative empirical evidence: The article offers significant qualitative evidence 
and argumentation to support the applicability of the theory. Brief examples 
motivating the modeling exercise, such as references to well-known events or 
previous empirical findings (qualitative or quantitative) that the model aims to 
explain, were not coded in this category. We further divided articles in this category 
into three subcategories (not mutually exclusive): cross-case comparison, case 
studies, and evidence for assumptions. 
o   Cross-case comparison: The article compares two or more cases (either 
across space or across time), arguing that the patterns of covariation support 
the model’s predictions. This is the classic “small-n” comparison. 
o   Case studies: The article aims to convince the reader that the model 
accurately characterizes or explains a sequence of events in one or a small 
number of closely examined cases. These case studies engage in process 
tracing, if only implicitly. 
o   Qualitative evidence for assumptions: The article provides significant 
qualitative justification for some aspect of the setup of the model or the key 
tradeoffs the model examines. Evidence is offered that these assumptions 
are frequently true, or at least true in certain important cases. This kind of 
evidence typically appears prior to presenting the model, or is concurrent 
with the model presentation. 
